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Abstract 
 
Previous studies have linked human capital with performance.  The studies have 
shown performance, measured as output, of a firm can be increased by adding more 
personnel and/or increasing education levels.  This research uses the Cobb-Douglas 
Production function to build upon that relationship of inputs to outputs.  The output in 
this study is the average cost overrun of Aeronautical Systems Center research, 
development, test, and evaluation contracts managed from 1994 to 2008.  The inputs are 
the numbers of military/government employee financial managers, program managers, 
engineers, rated personnel, and military/government employees in those career fields 
possessing a graduate degree or higher.  A time series regression was conducted using 
those inputs to outputs while controlling for other factors such as budgetary fluctuations, 
inflation, and individuals doing defense related work in the private sector as a proxy for 
contractors working in program offices.  The results indicate a negatively correlated 
relationship exists between human capital and cost overruns. 
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THE CORRELATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL ON COSTS OF AIR FORCE 
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this research was to determine if there is a relationship between 
the number of program office personnel and their corresponding education levels on cost 
variances for contracts managed by the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) located at 
Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (WPAFB).  This research focused on civilian and 
military personnel assigned to the cost, program management, and engineering career 
fields as well as rated officers assigned to acquisition positions within the Air Force 
Materiel Command (AFMC) at WPAFB.  Rated officers are military personnel that 
possess an aeronautical rating. 
Previous Research 
 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) routinely experiences difficulty in fielding 
major weapon systems within allotted budgets.  The Air Force is no exception and has 
historically struggled with cost overruns.  Multiple studies have been completed with 
little success in finding a policy lever to implement to overcome cost overruns.  The next 
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few sections of this chapter briefly cover studies completed on overruns, acquisition 
reform, the private sector, the current Air Force labor force and the research objective. 
Overrun Studies 
 Historical studies on cost overruns indicate they have ranged from an underrun of 
1% to an overrun of 68% (Christensen & Gordon, 1998; Drezner, Jarvaise, Hess, Norton, 
& Hough, 1993; Rusnock, 2008).  The results from those studies varied with respect to 
the causes of the cost overruns.  Drezner et al. (1993) found there was no “silver bullet” 
strategy in bringing cost overruns under control.  Their study quantified the magnitude of 
weapon system cost growth along a number of dimensions but they could not definitively 
account for the observed cost growth patterns (Drezner et al., 1993).  Christensen et al. 
(1998) identified estimation error as the causal factor in cost overruns.  Rusnock (2008) 
discovered cost overruns vary significantly by commodity type.  She found cost overruns 
in space systems varied significantly from those in aircraft and missiles and ascertained 
certain predictor variables have a causal relationship with overruns in space systems.  She 
found communications missions, ground equipment, firm-fixed price contracts, and 
increased program manager tenure are all predictive of lower cost growth for military 
space systems (Rusnock, 2008).  Regardless of the cause of the overrun, the increased 
costs result in additional funds being directed to the program thus creating instability in 
the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) system currently used by 
the DoD.  The perpetual drain on investment accounts as a result of instability was what 
led Dr. Paul G. Kaminksi, a former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, to adopt 
program stability as his number one acquisition reform initiative (Czelusniak, 1997).  In 
extreme cases, overruns led to program cancellations like the Navy’s A-12 program and 
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the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) for the Air Force (FAS, 2009).  Both 
programs experienced significant cost growth leading to the DoD cancelling them (FAS, 
2009). 
Acquisition Reform 
Some historical studies reviewed specifically acquisition reform and whether or 
not the initiatives set forth by the government had any effect on cost overruns.  The 
results of those studies are mixed.  For example, Christensen et al. (1999) examined 269 
defense programs from 1988 through 1995 and found the Packard Commission 
recommendations did not reduce average cost overruns at all.  During that time period, 
the cost performance on those contracts actually worsened significantly (Christensen et 
al., 1999).  The Packard Commission was initiated in 1985 by President Reagan and was 
focused on broad organizational changes within the DoD and would become the Reagan 
Administration’s most recognized acquisition reform movement (Holbrook, 2003).  
Drezner et al. (1993) found similar results of the ineffectiveness of reform initiatives in 
reviewing 197 acquisition programs from 1960 through 1990.  Holbrook (2003) also 
found parallel results.  There was no statistically significant difference in the overruns 
percentages on pre-reform contracts and post-reform contracts (Holbrook, 2003).   
Smirnoff (2006) however found the Packard Commission, the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 
1982 and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 all led to significant 
cost savings.  The Nunn-McCurdy Act requires the DoD to notify Congress when cost 
growth exceeds 15% of the original estimate and calls for programs to be cancelled if 
growth is over 25% of the original estimate unless the DoD submits justification for the 
program to continue.  FASA’s intent was to overhaul the cumbersome and complex 
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procurement system of the federal government and more importantly the DoD (Holbrook, 
2003). 
Private Sector Studies 
The previous studies attempted to identify causes of overruns and effectiveness of 
government wide reform initiatives.  Some private sector studies go even further by 
scrutinizing individual workers to determine the effects of individual efforts on overall 
firm productivity.  The studies are not specific to DoD cost estimating but the same 
outcome is generalizable to any organization because the studies measured individual 
efforts without regard to specific career fields.  The two types of studies are those relating 
to the number of personnel (Aral, Brynjolfsson & Van Alstyne, 2007; Li, 2002; Shaw & 
Weekley, 1985) and those relating to the education level of personnel (Bartel, 1994; 
Lynch & Black, 1995; Nelson & Phelps, 1966).  These studies concluded the number of 
personnel and their corresponding education level are positively correlated with firm 
performance.  A few of the studies argued for some of the indirect benefits of education 
for the firm.  Two studies found the more educated a firm’s employees are, the more 
likely they are to be innovative and productive (Blundell, Dearden & Meghir, 1996; 
Lynch & Black, 1995). 
Current Air Force Manning and Research Objective 
The Air Force has incurred manpower reductions throughout its history and has 
lost some very talented personnel within its ranks.  However, the Air Force realized 
favorable retention rates following September 11, 2001, and received additional 
manpower authorizations from Congress due to the global war on terrorism (GWOT) 
(Military Personnel End Strength, n.d.).  Those additional authorizations were on a year 
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by year basis.  The Air Force anticipated their authorized end strength numbers would 
decrease over time as the GWOT efforts would hopefully diminish and the entire DoD 
would begin to downsize once again. 
In order to meet their projected end strength numbers, the Air Force instituted 
force shaping initiatives which allowed and in some cases forced service members to 
depart the Air Force ahead of their active duty service commitments.  This decision is 
currently a hot topic of debate among Air Force leaders and members alike.  The 
Secretary of Defense, in considering the burdens created by a reduced workforce, did not 
think force shaping was the right tool at the time to re-size the Air Force so he halted the 
force shaping initiatives in June of 2008 (Randolph, 2008) shortly after forcing the 
Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
General Michael Moseley to resign. 
Force shaping was just one of many initiatives in the history of the Air Force to 
trim down the ranks.  This research is not concerned with the overarching reasoning 
behind reducing the force but instead tries to establish a relationship between the number 
and education level of people in the Air Force and cost overruns.  The reduction of 
manpower over the years while at the same time the amount of acquisition work has 
remained relatively stable or increased in some years is the reason behind this research.  
The amount of money spent on Air Force RDT&E programs theoretically relates to the 
amount of manpower required in supporting those programs.  In other words, large dollar 
value RDT&E contracts require many smart and talented personnel to oversee them 
because there are several parts of that high dollar RDT&E contract to oversee.  In Figure 
1 on the next page, the Air Force overall end strength representing all career fields has 
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steadily decreased while the Air Force total RDT&E budget has either remained 
reasonably constant or slightly increased.  This study will attempt to determine if adding 
more people or education will help with better managing those RDT&E programs 
resulting in fewer overruns. 
 
 
Figure 1 Air Force End Strength-includes both active duty and civil service 
employees (DoD FY09 Budget Greenbook) 
 
 
 
Organization of the Study 
This chapter established the incentive for this study and the research objective.  
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature related to this research.  Chapter 3 details the 
methodology used to model the relationship between human capital and cost overruns 
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and Chapter 4 provides the results of the analysis with a brief discussion of the significant 
findings.  Lastly, Chapter 5 provides conclusions on the study and recommends future 
areas of research.  
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II.  Literature Review 
 
 This research examines the relationship between cost overruns and human capital.  
Specifically it examines the education and number of personnel assigned to career fields 
that make up the bulk of the composition of program offices at WPAFB on the cost 
variances of contracts managed by ASC.  This chapter provides a background on 
previous literature that has been published on this subject. 
Historical Reform in Acquisitions 
 
We expect to achieve greater successes from every person, dollar, and hour we expend to 
acquire and sustain our current and new weapon systems. 
-Darlene Druyun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
for Acquisition and Management 1997 
 
 There have been multiple studies and audits regarding DoD acquisitions which I 
will briefly cover in this chapter.  Researchers and decision makers are always looking 
for a policy lever in acquisition reform to try to control costs and schedule.  
Unfortunately, the results are inconclusive as to what that policy lever might be.  This 
section briefly reviews some historical actions and reforms undertaken by the DoD to 
control costs.  In the early 1990s, senior leaders within the Department of the Air Force 
recognized the need to streamline acquisitions and become more efficient due to the 
shrinking DoD industrial base and budget.  Some examples of historical studies initiated 
by the government are the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard 
Commission) of 1986 to review the consolidation of the defense industrial base.  
Resulting reforms include the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 to revise the 
DoD 5000 series regulations incorporating flexibility into acquisition policies and 
procedures (Holbrook, 2003).  In addition to the above quote by Ms. Druyun and putting 
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aside any irony that would later develop from her statement, she goes on to say the 
necessary reform direction “…is basically toward creating a partnership with our 
contractors.  They are not our enemy.  If we erect a wall between us, then chances are we 
are going to walk away with a failure” (Kitfield, 1997).  There was a huge movement 
within the Air Force to get contracts under control and to rein in the contractors on 
performance, costs, and schedule.  One initiative that came about during this timeframe 
was an approach called TSPR (Total System Performance Responsibility).  TSPR is an 
acquisition approach that responds to the government’s and industry’s recognition of 
change needed in government procurement (Pandes, 2001).  TSPR was a creative 
contracting method in that it moved several of the functions previously accomplished by 
the government side to the contractor.  TSPR was the response to another Secretary of 
Defense initiative requiring the use of performance specifications rather than military 
specifications (Pandes, 2001). 
 Additionally, there were several reforms in Earned Value Management Systems 
(EVMS) during the early 1990s.  Earned value is a measurement tool used to manage 
projects.  It does this by tracking the performance of work units in the work break down 
structure, and tracking cost and schedule of work performed against a planning baseline 
((Defense Acquisition University, 2008).  Earned value programs consisting of 32 
stringent criteria have been in place for large, flexibly priced defense contracts since 1967 
(Christensen, 1998).  Originally, the criteria were established by the Air Force as 
cost/schedule planning and control specifications (C/SPEC) but they were later adopted 
by all the military services as cost/schedule control systems criteria (C/SCSC).  C/SCSC 
was then slightly modified and renamed earned value management control systems 
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criteria, all the while maintaining the principles of the 32 original criteria (Christensen, 
1998).  Over the years, implementation of the criteria consistently across the services or 
even within the same service, proved to be a cumbersome project.  Some studies 
indicated the criteria was more non-value added activity by contractors and program 
managers (GAO, 1997).  The fundamental use of earned value systems was tainted when 
the Navy’s A-12 program was cancelled.  The shortcomings of the system and those who 
used it were notoriously cited as potential reasons for the downfall of the A-12.  When 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney canceled the program in January 1991, he complained 
that no one could tell him its final cost (Morrison, 1991).  Earned value concepts are 
integral to the management of large, complex acquisition efforts and if used objectively, 
can facilitate successful project completion. 
 Reformation of regulations, modification to acquisition processes, and 
implementation of systems are all active approaches in trying to control contract 
performance.  The quantity and quality of acquisition personnel should also be reviewed 
as a feasible alternative to managing DoD contracts because the personnel are just as 
important as the regulations and processes.  Military officers that are financial managers 
routinely seek positions outside of acquisitions because the acquisition corps is 
sometimes considered a career killer for the finance community and it can be difficult to 
attain higher rank while remaining assigned to acquisitions (McCrary, 2008).  In 2009, 
the United States House of Representatives approved a 2009 authorization bill with 
provisions proposing sweeping changes to the way the Pentagon acquires major weapon 
systems.  One of the many changes proposed in the bill is the creation of an acquisition 
career track within the military, including general officer positions in each service, 
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agency, and combatant command (Bennett, 2008).  Many studies have linked acquisition 
problems to the shrinking acquisition corps among the many other factors discussed 
previously in this section (Holbrook, 2003; Feuring, 2007). 
Cost Variance 
 
 There are two types of cost variance measurements (Feuring, 2007).  One 
measure, cost growth, compares a program’s beginning budget versus the final budget to 
see if there was an increase in the overall costs.  The other measure, cost overrun, 
analyzes the cost performance of a program’s contract to see if there was a difference in 
the budgeted cost versus the actual cost at several points throughout the period of 
performance of the contract.  Sipple, White and Greiner (2004) reviewed a myriad of 
studies on cost overruns and indicated the causes of those overruns are the starting point 
to identify a model that allows cost variance to be predicted and controlled (Feuring, 
2007).  Feuring’s (2007) focused research on cost overruns indicated they can be reduced 
by adding more cost analysts or increasing education levels of existing cost analysts.  
This work expands on Feuring’s work and adds program managers, engineers, and rated 
personnel as having a correlating relationship with cost overruns. 
 Several studies indicate estimation errors as a common cause of both cost 
overruns and cost growth.  Christensen, Searle, and Vickery (1999) found costs are 
underestimated initially, specifically Milestone B or the “official start” of an acquisition 
program, which biases the remaining estimates in many cases.  Subsequent estimates use 
the initial estimate as a baseline so it is difficult to recover from a “bad baseline” in 
building an accurate final program cost.  As a program requires more funds than were 
originally planned, decision makers have to respond by either reducing the quantity or 
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performance for the system, or they have to reallocate funds from other programs in order 
to make up for the shortfall (Arena et al., 2006).  Reallocating from other programs or 
cutting requirements from the existing program only exacerbates the problem across the 
entire resource constrained Air Force (Czelusniak, 1997).  These decisions eventually 
lead to more bad decisions resulting in increased costs.  Estimation error not only occurs 
up front, but can be found throughout the performance of a contract, especially if 
requirements are constantly changing and the budget is unstable.  Pannell (1994) found 
many of the estimation errors occur during the production periods of acquisition 
programs.  These errors in the estimation of production costs arise because of cost 
estimating errors, data omissions, schedule slips attributable to technical problems, 
system weight growth, and inadequately scoped engineering efforts (Pannell, 1994).  The 
Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group (OSD CAIG, 
2001) reviewed several programs trying to uncover the causes of cost variances and they 
determined two main effects were to blame: mistakes and decisions.  Mistakes such as 
underestimated efforts and decisions such as using too optimistic of a learning curve were 
specifically mentioned as causes of error. 
Decisions and the Role of Systems Engineering 
 
 There are obviously more key players in the process than just cost analysts that 
make poor estimating decisions resulting in cost overruns.  A typical program office is 
manned by several different specialties.  This research focuses on a select few from the 
government side because ultimately, they are the key players in the decision making 
process.  This study specifically examines program managers, engineers, rated officers, 
and cost analysts assigned to WPAFB working on aircraft development programs.  All 
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four areas must work closely together to keep a program on schedule and on cost while 
maintaining the requirements desired by the end user.  The program manager is 
ultimately responsible for making the decisions, but they must rely heavily upon the team 
of engineers for technical requirements, the cost analysts for fiscal requirements, and the 
rated officers for end user performance requirements.  In many cases, rated officers are 
also program managers at WPAFB.  The rated officers serving as program managers have 
dual responsibilities in that they must make sure the performance requirements of the end 
user are being met while also managing cost and schedule requirements to ensure the 
program can succeed.  The process of managing programs has been studied extensively 
by the DoD.  Numerous research efforts have been completed looking for policy levers in 
executing successful acquisition management.  Regulations have even been written to 
establish a simplified and flexible management framework for translating mission needs 
into stable, affordable, and well-managed programs (DoD 5000.2, 2003).  The effective 
integration of the four previous mentioned career fields’ contributions are paramount to 
the success of the overall acquisition system.  The acquisition system is an integrated 
composite of people, products, and processes that provide a capability to satisfy a stated 
need or objective (DAU SE Handbook, 2001).  All four key specialties must be well 
versed in DoD acquisitions and understand how they each play a vital role in the overall 
system.  In 1990, Congress recognized that importance and enacted the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA, 1990).  Congress intended for 
DAWIA to improve the effectiveness of the personnel who manage and implement 
defense acquisition programs (Garcia et al., 1997).  All personnel assigned to acquisition 
positions must achieve and maintain certification levels for their field, as required by the 
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DAWIA.  One of the requirements for certification is the completion of Acquisition 101 
(ACQ 101), Fundamentals of System Acquisition (DAU, 2008).  In ACQ 101, all of the 
key players in acquisitions are introduced and corresponding roles they play in the 
acquisition process are explained.  A key component explained in ACQ 101 is the 
concept of systems engineering management.  As illustrated by Figure 2, systems 
engineering management is accomplished by integrating three major activities:  
development phasing that controls the design process and provides baselines that 
coordinate design efforts, a systems engineering process that provides a structure for 
solving design problems and tracking requirements flow through the design effort, and 
life cycle integration that involves customers in the design process and ensures the 
system developed is viable throughout its life (DAU SE Handbook, 2001). 
 
Figure 2 Systems Engineering Activities (DAU SE Handbook, 2001) 
 
Throughout the systems engineering process decisions are made by personnel in all four 
areas of expertise.  Some examples include but are not limited to: 
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• The cost analyst must decide on ground rules and assumptions in estimating the 
costs based upon best available data. 
• The engineers must decide on acceptable performance parameters and technology 
readiness levels. 
• The rated officers bring expertise and credibility for dealing with end users in 
communicating the user needs. 
• The program manager must decide on schedule baselines and act upon the 
decisions of the other three key players in the process. 
An important distinction to note here is all of the decisions are interrelated.  That is, no 
one particular decision should be made without considering the effects of that decision on 
the other areas.  This concept revolves around effective communication.  The foundation 
of systems engineering is communication and it is imperative to program success that the 
channels of communication are wide open and clear (DAU SE Handbook, 2001).  The 
concept of systems engineering should not consume the overall efforts of the program.  
However, key decision makers should be well versed in the concept.  An analysis by the 
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) Systems Engineering center of 
excellence (SECOE) indicates that optimal effort spent on Systems Engineering is about 
15-20% of the total project effort (Honour, 2002).  At the same time, studies have shown 
that Systems Engineering essentially leads to reduction in costs among other benefits 
(Honour, 2002). 
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Aircraft Programs Versus Other Programs 
 
 Previous research on cost overruns was at a macro level and has either looked 
across the entire DoD (Holbrook, 2003) or the entire Air Force (Feuring, 2007).  This 
study takes a more micro approach similar to Rusnock (2008).  Rusnock looked at 
programs managed by the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) whereas this research 
looks at programs managed by ASC, primarily aircraft programs.  While Rusnock’s 
research focused on cost growth, our research will focus on cost overruns.  The Air Force 
Material Command (AFMC) manages three product centers: ASC, Air Armament Center, 
and Electronic Systems Center (ESC) (AFMC Factsheet, 2008).  While all three product 
centers manage different types of programs, the results of this research are generalizable 
to the other centers as well because the acquisition profiles of all three centers are 
relatively the same.  The reasoning behind looking only at ASC managed programs was 
threefold: First, the ASC data is easily available; second, the close proximity of ASC; and 
third, the acquisition profile of space is quite different than aircraft. 
Military space systems differ from other defense systems in two ways: their 
operational environment and their acquisition life cycle (Rusnock, 2008).  Space vehicles 
operate in much harsher environments than those of aircraft.  Those environments are 
also very remote, often thousands of miles up in space.  Corrections or alterations to the 
on-orbit system range from extremely expensive at best, to virtually impossible.  Space 
systems are also frequently acquired in small quantities as compared to aircraft and 
follow on maintenance for launched systems is practically non-existent.  Because of these 
factors, heavy emphasis is placed upon the survivability of the system early on in the 
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acquisition life cycle and few dollars are spent in the production and sustainment phases 
as compared to the RDT&E phase (Rusnock, 2008) as compared to aircraft programs.  As 
seen in Figure 3, an aircraft system incurs most of its costs in the operating and support 
phase whereas Figure 4 shows a space system incurs the majority of their costs during the 
systems acquisition phase.  The difference in cost distribution is the result of the 
significant costs of developing the space vehicle and launching it which is paid with 
RDT&E funds.  In comparison, the O&M costs are relatively minor and represent the 
resources needed to pay for ground support operations.  Our research specifically 
examines RDT&E cost plus contract cost overruns so it would not be appropriate to 
include space system acquisitions. 
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Figure 3 Aircraft System Life Cycle Cost Curve (Rusnock, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 4 Space System Life Cycle Cost Curve (Rusnock, 2008) 
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It is worth mentioning software development programs are also quite different 
from aircraft and space systems which are why we did not include those types of efforts 
in our research.  Software acquisition has steadily increased since the early 1980s where 
software development comprises a large portion of just about any development effort.  
Analysts historically determine costs based on the number of Source Lines of Code 
(SLOC).  Estimates differ depending on how many SLOC are commercial off the shelf 
(COTS) versus originally authored by programmers.  The total actual SLOC number, 
however, will likely be greater as past experience with software estimation has shown the 
size is typically both underestimated and functionality is added as the development 
progresses (Pracchia, 2004).  That is not to say aircraft program requirements remain 
stable. Compared to aircraft programs which are approaching 100 years of development, 
software development is a rapidly changing environment and technology often outpaces 
development efforts leading to many unknowns in estimating software costs.  A software 
cost estimation model is doing well if it can estimate software development costs within 
20% of the actual costs, 70% of the time, and within the class of projects to which it has 
been calibrated (Boehm, 1984). 
Human Capital 
 
 The sheer number of people, their corresponding training or education in the field 
in which they work, and their motivation all affect job performance and efficiency 
(Bartel, 1994; Lynch & Black, 1995).  Feuring (2007) found education of cost analysts to 
be statistically significant on the amount of cost overruns in the Air Force.  There are 
several differences between education and training but due to data limitations, this 
research will focus on the education of individuals.  Acquisition specific training via the 
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Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is highly regarded within the acquisition 
community and is required for professionals assigned to acquisitions (DAWIA, 1990).  
There are specific Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP) levels that 
must be attained at certain points throughout acquisition careers (DAWIA, 1990).  Again, 
due to data limitations, that workforce specific ADPD training data is not available.  As a 
result, this research will focus on post secondary education levels.  Previous research 
supports that more highly educated individuals have a greater probability of receiving 
both employer-provided training and work-related training (Blundell et al., 1996).  Firms 
that invest in employees’ education tend to see returns on those investments either in the 
form of increased productivity or employee loyalty to the firm (Bartel, 1994).  
Companies that retain highly skilled workers will normally perform better than those 
companies that either do not incentivize education or allow their educated employees to 
walk out the door (Bartel, 1994).  The next section will look at previous research on the 
number of personnel in a firm while the second section deals with education levels of 
employees. 
Number of People 
Feuring’s (2007) research concluded that increasing the number of cost analysts 
can have a decreasing effect on cost overruns.  Teams usually outperform individuals in 
just about any task (Hill, 1982).  Teams made up of the right skill set and quantity of 
people will certainly outperform individuals (Bliss & Potter, 2005).  Bliss and Potter’s 
(2005) research found that in a sample of over three thousand mutual funds over a twelve 
year horizon, funds managed by teams outperformed individual managed funds by over 
70 basis points per year and had lower expense ratios.   Even the fastest and smartest 
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individuals have limits and their performance will start to decline once that saturation 
point has been reached.  For example, a stock analyst’s performance begins to decline 
once the portfolio they are managing exceeds 12-13 stocks (Li, 2002).  Another study 
found an inverted-U shaped relationship exists between multitasking and productivity 
such that, beyond an optimum, more multitasking is associated with declining project 
completion rates and revenue generation (Aral et al., 2007).  Some research has 
considered that optimum for two of the variables we are examining.  Wheelwright & 
Clark (1992) explained the following for engineers:  
When an engineer focused on a single project is given a second one, utilization 
often rises slightly because the engineer no longer has to wait for the activities of 
others involved in that single project.  Instead, the engineer can move back and 
forth between the two projects.  However, if a third, fourth, or even fifth project is 
added, the percentage of time spent on value-adding tasks drops rapidly, as an 
increasing fraction of valuable time is spent on non value-adding tasks--
coordinating, remembering, or tracking down information, for example. (p. 90) 
 
Feuring (2007) found that as defense employment grew, cost overruns actually increased.  
As the Air Force gets bigger, we incur more overruns because the Air Force has become 
too large and has entered into an area of diseconomies of scale (Feuring, 2007).  These 
results could be generalized to a typical program office where complex systems are being 
managed and critical decisions are made by team members.  There are also indirect 
aspects of being overworked.  Workers will begin to resent their jobs and with the 
increase in anxiety and stress, their performance may begin to falter.  In an experimental 
study, workers in overloaded situations felt more pressure, had less task enjoyment, and 
felt more depressed (Shaw & Weekley, 1985).  If this sort of situation were to be 
prolonged, one might expect it to have a negative effect on performance (Feuring, 2007). 
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Education Levels of Employees 
Cost overruns cannot be corrected by just adding more people to program offices.  
Program offices may already have the right number of people but they may not have the 
right mix of people of the proper number of educated people.  So, adding more education 
to those personnel assigned to program offices may be a part of the solution.  Previous 
research examined education at both the individual and firm level, but this research will 
focus only on productivity at the firm level.  Program offices are teams of people doing 
acquisition efforts so it would not be appropriate to analyze output at the individual level, 
but more appropriate at the firm level, or program office level.  Program offices typically 
consist of several people assigned to teams working toward the same goal of acquiring 
and delivering weapon systems.  Bartel (1994) used a Cobb-Douglas production function 
to estimate the impact of employee training at the firm level because previous research 
had only focused on the individual level (Feuring, 2007).  Organizations that were 
operating below expected productivity levels increased their performance after training 
programs were implemented (Bartel, 1994).  By using the Cobb-Douglas production 
again, for every 10% increase in average formal education levels of employees, an 8.5% 
increase in productivity in manufacturing and 12.7% in non-manufacturing firms results 
(Lynch & Black, 1995).  Human capital in the form of education is an integral component 
to any organization.  This is especially true in the ASC organization where development 
of new aircraft weapon systems include copious amounts of new technologies.  Due to 
those cutting edge technologies, ASC needs motivated and incredibly smart people.  
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Highly educated workers have a comparative advantage with respect to the adjustment to 
and implementation of new technologies (Bartel, 1987).  Bartel (1987) also states the 
relative demand for educated workers declines as the ages of plant and equipment 
increase, especially in research and development intensive industries.  Education 
enhances one’s ability to receive, decode, and understand information (Nelson & Phelps, 
1966).  Due to the Air Force constantly updating and modernizing their weapon systems, 
the ability to handle new information is critical. 
Summary 
 
This chapter examined previous literature regarding historical reform in 
acquisitions and the role of human capital in acquisitions.  The next chapter will build 
upon those relationships in constructing a model to test the effectiveness of acquisition 
personnel and cost overruns. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
This study will link human capital to performance using an objective measure of 
performance.  The objective measure will be the amount of cost overruns realized per 
year by all programs managed by ASC.  The method of analysis for this study is the 
Cobb-Douglas production function similar to Feuring (2007).  This research expands 
upon Feuring’s work and analyzes additional independent variables along with similar 
variables used in his 2007 thesis.  The next section will clarify how the objective yearly 
cost overruns were quantified. 
Objective Measure of Performance 
 
There are multiple measures available for attempting to quantify successful 
acquisition contract performance.  A complete and successful demonstration of the end 
state system being procured is ultimately the goal but there are key indicators transparent 
throughout the process to measure whether or not the program is on an executable path.  
One such measure is the schedule of the project.  Are key milestones being met along the 
way and important deliverables occurring in accordance with the schedule?  Many 
program offices spend immeasurable amounts of efforts in managing schedules and 
ensuring the acquisition is proceeding as planned.  Another factor that receives a lot of 
scrutiny is cost.  There are two methods in measuring cost increases and decreases, 
specifically cost growth and cost overrun.  Cost growth is calculated by subtracting the 
initial estimate from the final cost, while a cost overrun is computed by subtracting the 
budgeted cost of work performed from the actual cost of work performed (Christensen, 
1998).  This cost overrun definition is consistent with the Earned Value Management 
25 
 
System (Defense Acquisition University, 2008).  This research is concerned with 
estimation error, so cost overrun is the more appropriate measure for the context of this 
research.  Factors which are out of the program’s control, such as funding instabilities 
and/or changes in the scope of a requirement, can lead to cost growth but not to cost 
overruns (Feuring, 2007).  The actual cost of work performed versus the budgeted cost of 
work performed, or the cost overrun calculation, better captures how well a program was 
estimated.  Figure 5 illustrates the cost variance computation which in due course results 
in cost overruns. 
 
Figure 5 Earned Value Management Gold Card (DAU, 2008) 
EAC: Estimate at Completion  ACWP: Actual Cost of Work Performed 
TAB: Total Allocated Budget  BCWS: Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled 
BAC: Budget at Completion   BCWP: Budgeted Cost of Work Performed 
PMB: Program Management Baseline 
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 The ACWP line or the actual cost of work performed reveals the actual cost of 
work accomplished.  The BCWS line or the budgeted cost for work scheduled reflects the 
value of work planned to be accomplished.  The BCWP line or the budgeted cost for 
work performed is the value of work actually accomplished or the earned value.  The 
BCWP takes into account changes in the scope of requirements and budget.  The cost 
variance is computed by taking the difference between ACWP and BCWP.  The cost 
variance in essence is the delta between what has been spent and what was planned to be 
spent for the same amount of work performed.  Cost variance is equivalent to a cost 
overrun because it takes into account the budgeted amount which includes program 
changes and changes in quantity for example (Feuring, 2007).  In contrast, cost growth 
alternatively is the difference between ACWP and the initial budget.  Program changes 
like quantity reductions or increased scope of the project are updated in the BCWP so to 
measure the difference in the initial budget and the BCWP or ACWP would not reflect 
any estimation inaccuracies. 
Data and Variables 
 
Dependent Variable 
 We collected data on the average cost overruns of ASC managed acquisitions per 
year from 1994 to 2008 using cost performance report (CPR) data from the Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES).  The DAES included all programs from the Air 
Force so to examine ASC specifically the data was sorted by the Department of Defense 
Activity Address Code (DoDAAC).  The DoDAAC is a code that uniquely identifies a 
unit with authority to requisition and receive materiel.  ASC’s DoDAAC is F33657 so 
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only contracts with that DoDAAC were included.  The amount of overrun for each 
weapon system was consolidated by fiscal year to give the average overrun for that year 
in percentage terms. 
 %Overrun = (ACWP-BCWP)
Independent Variables 
 * 100 (1) 
   (BCWP) 
 We collected the number of individuals working in program offices and their 
corresponding education levels from the Air Force Personnel Center’s Interactive 
Demographic Analysis System (IDEAS) database.  The bulk of ASC program office 
manning that influences contract decisions, with respect to cost, requirements, and 
schedules for example, come from eleven specific Air Force occupational specialty codes 
so this research focused on those respective career fields.  The occupational specialty 
codes and a brief description of their duties are illustrated in figure 6.   
 
Figure 6 Air Force Occupational Codes 
 
The eleven specific codes were consolidated by area of expertise into four basic 
groups: financial management, program management, engineering, and rated personnel.  
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We only considered personnel assigned to WPAFB owned by AFMC in the IDEAS 
database.  It is important to note the database query included personnel assigned to 
AFMC headquarters and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).  However, 
personnel assigned to both of those organizations support ASC managed acquisitions.  
This research attempted to verify Feuring’s (2007) thesis which identified a statistically 
significant relationship between cost analysts and cost overruns.  However, due to 
limitations of the data, our research combines cost analysts and financial analysts into the 
same independent variable, mainly due to the inclusion of the civilian financial analyst 
career field.  Civilian financial analysts and cost analysts both have the same 
occupational specialty, 501, so to avoid incorrect statistical inferences with respect to cost 
analysts versus financial analysts, the two were combined.  The rated personnel variable 
includes both pilots and navigators in the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and below. 
 The education level variable is a raw percentage of all the personnel discussed in 
the previous paragraph having a graduate degree or higher. 
Control Variables 
 We added control variables to the model to account for other plausible causes of 
cost overruns.  We included the historical ASC research and development (R&D) budget 
per year as a technological proxy.  One of the common criticisms of inaccurate estimates 
is that new weapon systems are becoming more complex requiring more R&D funds and 
thus are more difficult to estimate (Feuring, 2007).  Increased R&D funding could be the 
result of more programs or just more complex systems so there is a possibility for some 
error here.  We want to account for other plausible causes of cost overruns by tracking 
the changes in R&D funding but without knowing if the changes resulted from more 
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complex programs or just more programs, we cannot make statistical significant 
inferences to cost overruns based upon the changes in the R&D budget. 
 Another variable added to the model is the amount of outsourced work to private 
contractors at ASC.  Over the years, the amount of contractor support in program offices 
has increased substantially, but trying to quantify that outsourced work is extremely 
difficult.  The type of work that was outsourced is even more difficult to quantify as these 
contractors support the occupations explored in this research as well as logistics and 
administration.  Following the same method as Feuring’s (2007) model, a raw number of 
people doing defense related work in private industry was added to the model (DoD 
Greenbook, 2009).  This number provides a trend for the amount of work that was 
outsourced per year by the DoD so the same results could be generalized to ASC. 
 We added unexpected inflation as another control variable to the model.  The 
budgets executed by ASC over the years represent billions of dollars so even a minor 
change in the anticipated inflation represents significant cost overruns.  Table 5-10 of the 
OUSD Greenbooks for various fiscal years were utilized to capture the unexpected 
inflation variable.  Table 5-10 contains anticipated inflation as well as the actual inflation 
for each year.  OUSD publishes new inflation rates in January of each year at which time 
budgets are adjusted to account for anticipated inflation.  If the actual inflation is higher 
than anticipated, then the budget was not sufficient to cover the project and an overrun 
occurred.  The opposite would be true for actual inflation being less than anticipated; the 
budget would be overfunded resulting in a cost underrun.  This research tries to link 
human capital to overruns so it is important to remove the effects of unexpected inflation. 
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Model 
 The basic Cobb-Douglas production function is given by: (Cobb and Douglas, 
1928). 
  (2) 
Where Q is a measure of output, A is the technological parameter, K is the capital, L is 
the labor and the exponents are some proportionate value summing to one of K and L.  
This model indicates that as more capital or labor is added then more output is achieved.  
This model was adapted by adding another input variable, education, by Lynch & Black 
(1995). 
  (3) 
For this research, Q is the cost overrun, K is the capital of defense industries, L is a 
vector of the four occupational areas, E is the education level of those individuals and the 
exponents again are some percentage summing to one.  We conducted a log-log 
transformation on equation (3) to linearize the specification for ease of estimation. 
 ln Q = βlnK + γlnLFM + ζlnLEN + λlnLPM +  (4) 
 ηlnLRated + δlnE +αX + ε 
 We observed negative values in four of the 15 dependent variable observations.  
This indicates for those 4 years, ASC actually incurred an underrun or programs came in 
under cost.  As such, we are not able to conduct a natural log transformation on those 
negative values.  Therefore, we added the same minimal constant to each of our 
dependent variables to get positive values for all observations.  Now that we have 
positive values for each year, we are able to log transform our dependent variables.  This 
method introduces some bias in the interpretation of our coefficients which we will 
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address in chapter five.  We assumed the capital of defense industries is a good proxy for 
the capital variable K.  Following the model specification used by Feuring (2007), the 
yearly defense industrial production index published by the Federal Reserve Bank was 
used because defense contractors utilize their own capital in support of R&D contracts.  
The use of industrial production data is a standard proxy for capital in the literature 
(Feuring, 2007).  We added the additional X variable to represent the vector of control 
variables discussed in the previous section.  We had zero and negative observations for 
the unexpected inflation variable so we did not conduct a natural log transformation on 
unexpected inflation.  We will interpret the coefficient as a semi-log if found statistically 
significant. 
 We omitted the technological parameter A in the original Cobb-Douglas 
production function in the final model specification.  When the final model is log 
transformed, the technological parameter A becomes the intercept in the linear equation.  
Since this study is concerned with the slope of the Cobb-Douglas function or the effects 
of human capital on cost overruns, the A parameter is given a value of one with no loss of 
generalizability (Feuring, 2007). 
Summary 
 
This chapter covered the model to be used in analyzing the effects of human 
capital on cost overruns and which variables will be used in the analysis.  The method of 
collection for the dependent and independent variables and why they are important to this 
study was also covered.  The next chapter will present the results of the analysis. 
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IV.  Results 
 
 We start by plotting cost overruns over time against the number of engineers, 
program managers, rated personnel, and cost analysts to get a visual representation of the 
data.  Each of the four career fields are plotted on separate scatter plots to visualize the 
effects of each career field on cost overruns.  Due to limitations of the data, our study 
ranged from 1994 through 2008, or represents only 15 years worth of data.  Our research 
does not attempt to forecast future relationships.  We are only concerned with uncovering 
historical relationships, if any, between human capital and cost overruns. 
 
Figure 7 Scatter Plots of Each Career Field on Cost Overruns 
 
There appears to be a relationship between the numbers of personnel in each career field 
and cost overruns.  The scatter plots visually imply that decreasing the number of 
engineers, program managers, and rated officers will cause the cost overruns to drift 
toward 0% and in some cases, actually go negative indicating cost underruns.  The 
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opposite is true for financial managers.  If you increase the number of financial managers, 
the cost overruns begin to improve as represented visually in Figure 7. 
 The summary statistics for our database are listed in Table 1 below.  The mean 
cost overrun for our study is 6.78% with a range of -5.89% to 27.69%.  The financial 
managers range from 385 to 476 with a mean of 437.  The number of program managers 
range from 812 to 1208 with a mean of 960.  The number of rated personnel range from 
65 to 298 with a mean of 128.  Lastly, the number of engineers range from 1942 to 2603 
with a mean of 2108.  Our last variable of interest, education, indicates the percentage of 
our sample as having a graduate degree or higher averaged 56.57% and ranged from 
47.69% to 62.30%.  This information is used later in the chapter for interpretation of the 
significant coefficients.   
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
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Pre-Estimation Specification Tests 
 A stationary time series regression model is one whose probability distributions 
are stable over time.  When variables in a time series regression are stationary, 
conventional statistical measures such as t-statistics and r-squared are the standard 
indicators used to assess the performance of the hypothesized model.  However, if the 
variables are non-stationary, such usual measures are no longer valid in the interpretation 
of the model and can lead to faulty conclusions and spurious regression.  If two non-
stationary variables that do not have a relationship like the height of a tree and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) are regressed, it will appear the height of the tree is affecting 
GDP (Feuring, 2007).  Therefore our dependent and independent variables must be 
stationary to successfully interpret our time series regression.  A common procedure 
throughout the literature for ensuring stationarity is to test the variables using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.  The variable is replaced with the change in that variable 
from one year to the next, called the first difference, if the variable is found to be non-
stationary.  Using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, financial managers, capital, 
RDT&E budget, and unexpected inflation variables all required a first difference to 
become stationary.  The program managers and education variables required a second 
difference while the defense employment variable required a third difference to become 
stationary.  The results of our Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are located in Appendix A. 
 The next pre-estimation specification test was to determine the appropriate lag 
lengths of the independent variables.  The theory behind lags is the effect of an 
independent variable may not be felt until later time periods in the dependent variable 
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(Feuring, 2007).  Often, the lag length is dictated by the frequency of the data as well as 
the sample size and usually one or two lags will suffice for annual data (Wooldridge, 
2006).  There are several lag length selection criteria available.  However, according to 
Liew’s (2004) research, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is recommended for 
samples with 60 observations or less so we used the AIC to determine the appropriate lag 
length of our sample of 15 observations.  To determine the appropriate lag length, we 
regressed up to two lags of each independent variable on the dependent variable and the 
results of the AIC and adjusted R squared are shown in table 2. 
Table 2 Lag Structure Determination 
 
In seven of the nine variables, the AIC was minimized when the adjusted R 
squared was maximized.  The RDT&E and defense employment variables were the other 
two variables where the minimized AIC and maximized adjusted R squared were 
different so they were defaulted to a no year lag.  Financial managers and rated personnel 
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were maximized at lags of two and all of the other variables, either by default or by 
maximization, were at no lags.  The financial managers and rated personnel two year lag 
is reasonable because both of those career fields rotate in and out of the acquisition field.  
Often, these personnel are assigned to complex acquisition programs so it can take a few 
years for them to become proficient in their new acquisition jobs.  As such, it is sensible 
to assume their contributions may not be felt for up to two years, hence the two year lag. 
 
Post-Estimation Specification Tests 
 Diagnostic checks were then completed to ensure the model specification did not 
violate any regression assumptions.  Tests for multi-collinearity, heteroskedasticity, auto-
correlation, cointegration, and normality were conducted. 
 The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was calculated to test for multi-collinearity.  
The results of those calculations are found in Appendix B.  The VIF value should be 
below 10 to ensure no collinearity between the independent variables.  The mean VIF for 
our model was 6.78 so our model does not exhibit the presence of multi-collinearity. 
 We empirically tested for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
test.  The results of that test yielded a p value of .2338 which indicates we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.  
 We tested for auto correlation using the Durbin-Watson test statistic which was 
2.0067.  A table of 5% significance for Durbin-Watson test statistics using 15 
observations and 9 variables resulted in a lower bound of .175 and an upper bound of 
3.216 in order to not be auto-correlated.  As such, our 2.0067 score is well within that 
range so we do not have auto-correlation.   
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 Due to the presence of unit roots and lagging some of our variables, the next post-
estimation specification test was to ensure there was no cointegration of the error terms.  
For cointegration, a pair of integrated, or smooth series, must have the property that a 
linear combination of them is stationary (Granger, 2003).  The Augmented-Dickey Fuller 
test was conducted on the residuals to ensure they are stationary.  The results of the test 
are located at the end of Appendix A.  The result was a test statistic of -3.74 giving a p-
value of .0016 indicating the residuals are stationary. 
 The last test was to check for normality in our model specification.  We tested for 
normality using the Jarque-Bera test statistic.  The Jarque-Bera test indicated a p-value of 
.8781, not enough to reject the null hypothesis of a normal distribution. 
 
Results 
 The results, with the required specification changes based upon the 
aforementioned diagnostic tests, are displayed in table 3 below. 
Table 3 Time Series Regression Results 
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 The time series regression results illustrate financial managers, rated personnel, 
and education are all significantly correlated with cost overruns.  Due to the small sample 
size of our data, we discuss the statistical inferences in terms of 95% confidence intervals 
instead of point estimates. 
 Specifically, the results show that by adding more financial managers, cost 
overruns will decrease.  For every 1% increase in financial managers, the cost overrun 
percentage may decrease anywhere from between 4.13% to 23.08%.  These results are 
similar to Fuering’s (2007) thesis except our research takes into account more control 
variables and limits our scope of research to only ASC managed programs.  The average 
number of financial managers is 437 so if ASC added 1% more, or approximately 4 more 
analysts, cost overruns would be expected to decrease by the above mentioned range. 
 Increasing the number of rated personnel is also correlated with cost overruns.  
For every 1% change in the number of rated personnel, cost overruns would be expected 
to decrease between .5% and 8.64%.  If rated personnel assigned to ASC were increased 
by 1%, cost overruns on average would decrease somewhere between .034% and .59% 
(average cost overrun = 6.78% * .5% or 8.64%).  Both .034% and .59% seem like 
insignificant amounts but when we considered the average total RDT&E budget, .034% 
and .59% equate to a range of $1.208 million to $20.963 million (average RDTE budget 
= $3,553 million * .034% or .59%). 
 The last statistically significant variable, education, also revealed a negatively 
correlated relationship with our dependent variable.  If we increase the percentage of 
graduate degrees or higher by 1%, cost overruns should decrease by a range of 
approximately .03% to 5.15%. 
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 There were no other statistically significant variables found in our regression.  
Unfortunately due to the small sample size of only 15 years worth of data, we are not able 
to make statistically significant inferences regarding these marginally significant 
variables but it is interesting to note the sign on the coefficient of those variables.  For 
example, the sign on the coefficients of program managers and defense employment 
indicate that increasing these variables may lead to reductions in cost overruns.  
Conversely, increasing engineers, capital and RDT&E may actually lead to more 
overruns.  More program managers and individuals doing defense related work should 
cause overruns to decrease because those individuals could better support complex 
acquisition programs.  However, the results of increasing the number of engineers seem 
counterintuitive.  Maybe ASC has reached a point of diseconomies of scale with respect 
to engineers and adding more engineers to program offices actually would make those 
program offices less efficient.  It is reasonable to assume increasing capital and RDT&E 
without corresponding respective human capital increases could possibly lead to poorer 
contract performance with regards to cost overruns. 
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V.  Discussion of Results and Recommendations 
 
In chapter four, our results yielded one independent variable statistically 
significant at the .05 level and two independent variables statistically significant at the 
.10 level.  Also in the previous chapter, we briefly discussed the signs on the coefficients 
of the other independent variables as well.  Recognizing we had a very small sample size, 
and the fact that we added a constant to our dependent variable (discussed in chapter 
three), we felt it is important to discuss the implications and limitations of our findings. 
First, remember from chapter three that we added a minimal amount to our 
dependent variable so we could log transform it keeping it consistent with the Cobb-
Douglas production function.  This added constant introduces some bias to our 
specification.  Specifically, we added .059 to each observation of our dependent variable.  
Due to this constant being a very small amount, the resulting bias is almost non-existent 
because the sum of the actual percentage and our added constant are then log 
transformed.  However, this bias, coupled with our small sample size obligates us to 
discuss the findings in terms of ranges versus point estimates. 
Second, should the Air Force now adopt policy changes based upon this analysis 
alone?  Probably not, but the results should definitely be considered.  We discussed our 
results in terms of confidence intervals of the effects on the cost overrun variable.  We 
used 95% confidence intervals in our interpretations.  This is where policy makers need 
to reflect on the cost versus benefit ratios of hiring additional personnel.  Our results 
show by increasing the financial manager, rated officer, and education level variables the 
cost overruns will decrease by some range.  However due to the small sample size of our 
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data, should the policy makers consider those results as being exact and factual?  We 
prefer to look at in the following manner. 
The policy makers should believe the hiring of additional people will equate to 
less cost overruns based upon our analysis, albeit arguable in some cases, or they can 
assume status quo and hope the overruns will decrease.  More research needs to be 
conducted in this area.  Specifically, we needed more ASC data to have a larger sample 
size increasing the statistical power of the analysis.  Perhaps, this research could be 
expanded to include the other AFMC centers or the Air Force as a whole.  Additionally, 
the research could be extended across the entire DoD to see if similar results are found, or 
more importantly, so the sample size is increased thereby improving the credibility of the 
results. 
The effect of program executive officers (PEOs) and program directors is an area 
that needs further study.  Most, if not all, program offices at ASC are managed by 
personnel above the grade of lieutenant colonel or equivalent and we assume that logic 
holds true across the other AFMC centers and services as well.  Our research was limited 
to personnel in the grades of lieutenant colonel and below or equivalent.  Unfortunately, 
the data for those higher ranked personnel was not easily available so we could not 
attempt to capture the effects.  We do feel it is important to mention that in Rusnock’s 
(2008) thesis, she found the tenure of PEO’s to be statistically significant and negatively 
correlated on the amount of cost growth in space acquisitions.  It would be interesting to 
see if the same effect would hold true for cost overruns or within ASC. 
Another area that needs further study is the delineation between education and 
training.  We would have preferred to model APDP levels versus graduate degrees or 
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higher as our education variable.  However, APDP levels for Air Force personnel are not 
centrally managed and easily available.  Acknowledging an individual with a graduate 
degree or higher will more than likely have greater analytical skills, DoD acquisition is a 
unique place which is why acquisition reform initiatives require specialty training in each 
field.  Additionally, the personnel modeled in our research could have held graduate 
degrees not remotely related to their career field.  For example, a financial analyst may 
have a graduate degree in history.  Several studies done on reform initiatives yielded 
mixed results but we could not find any research that looked specifically at the effects of 
APDP levels and cost overruns.  The education variable could be substituted with a 
percentage of personnel with the appropriate APDP level for each career field, indicating 
they had completed the required prerequisites for the function they were performing. 
Further study needs to be completed on the effects of the DoD procurement 
holiday that occurred in the early to mid 1990s.  The DoD as a whole went through times 
of shrinking budgets and personnel.  Unfortunately, due to the data available, our 
research starts in 1994 which is right in the midst of the aforesaid holiday.  Further 
studies need to be accomplished several years out into the future to eliminate the effects 
of the drawdown in terms of resources, including both dollars and people.  Also, the 
global war on terror (GWOT) began during the period of our research.  However, we feel 
we adjusted for GWOT by only including the RDT&E budget in our control variables.  
Most of the increased spending that occurred during GWOT took place in other fund 
types like procurement and operating and maintenance accounts.  Unfortunately, the DoD 
may be on the path to another period of reduced spending (“Fox News,” 2009) so further 
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research needs to be conducted on the effects of the ebbs and flows of defense spending 
on major acquisition programs. 
Last, more research needs to be done on the effects of contractors doing cost 
analysis, program management and engineering duties in program offices.  We used 
individuals doing defense related work in the private sector as a proxy for contractors.  
More detailed analysis needs to be done with regard to contractors doing what used to be 
accomplished by military and government employees.  ASC needs to better capture the 
type and amount of work that has been outsourced to contractors to ascertain their effect.  
In the future, someone could add contractor workers as a variable to mathematically 
determine if their efforts are more or less productive than military/government 
employees. 
 In conclusion, our research identified a relationship between human 
capital and cost overruns.  In previous literature, links between performance levels and 
human capital have been established.  Using the lessons learned from previous studies 
and the theoretical relationship of inputs and outputs of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, we presented analysis supporting a relationship exists between financial 
managers, rated personnel, education, and cost overruns.  By weighing the costs 
associated with acquiring more personnel and funding more education versus the 
potential savings associated with fewer cost overruns, ASC could potentially save 
significant amounts of money. 
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Appendix A Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results 
 
To ensure stationarity among our variables, EViews6 student version was used to 
run the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots.  We selected the trend and intercept 
toggle button and chose the Akaike Info Criterion (AIC) for lag length for each of our 
variables.  We log transformed all of our variables with the exception of the unexpected 
inflation variable due to the presence of negative values.  The results of the EViews 
output for each of our variables, including residuals, are presented here. 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LOG(OVERRUNS) has a unit root 
Unit Root Tests 
 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -11.31515  0.0001 
Test critical values: 1% level  -5.124875  
 5% level  -3.933364  
 10% level  -3.420030  
     
       
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOG(FINANCIAL_MANAGERS)) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 
-
6.662998  0.0008 
Test critical values: 1% level  
-
4.886426  
 5% level  3.828975  
 10% level  3.362984  
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Null Hypothesis: D(LOG(PROGRAM_MANAGERS),2) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.080343  0.0107 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.121990  
 5% level  -3.144920  
 10% level  -2.713751  
     
       
 
Null Hypothesis: LOG(RATED_PERSONNEL) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 4 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=4) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.540773  0.0009 
Test critical values: 1% level  -5.295384  
 5% level  -4.008157  
 10% level  -3.460791  
     
      
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LOG(ENGINEERS) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.380208  0.0051 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.004425  
 5% level  -3.098896  
 10% level  -2.690439  
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Null Hypothesis: D(LOG(EDUCATION),2) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.973134  0.0032 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.200056  
 5% level  -3.175352  
 10% level  -2.728985  
     
      
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOG(CAPITAL)) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.485077  0.0042 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.886426  
 5% level  -3.828975  
 10% level  -3.362984  
     
      
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(LOG(RDTE_BUDGET)) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.128962  0.0017 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.057910  
 5% level  -3.119910  
 10% level  -2.701103  
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Null Hypothesis: D(LOG(DEFENSE_EMPLOYMENT),3) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.805065  0.0040 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.200056  
 5% level  -3.175352  
 10% level  -2.728985  
           
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(UNEXPECTED_INFLATION) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=3) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.481932  0.0023 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.771926  
 5% level  -1.974028  
 10% level  -1.602922  
     
      
 
Null Hypothesis: RESIDUALS has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on AIC, MAXLAG=2) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.736327  0.0016 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.792154  
 5% level  -1.977738  
 10% level  -1.602074  
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Appendix B Variance Inflation Factors 
 
To check for multi-collinearity among our independent variables, we computed 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each of our independent variables.  We did this by 
running an ordinary least squares regression that has each independent variable as a 
function of all the other explanatory variables.  We took the resulting r-squared values 
and calculated the VIF for each variable using the following equation. 
  (5) 
Next we averaged all of the VIFs to arrive at the mean VIF for the variables in the model. 
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